

J. P. MORELAND, ONTOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
CLASS NOTES – FALL, 2011

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Week 1 – Monday, August 29, 2011

The Current Debate among Christian Scholars Regarding the Intermediate State

1. **Classical Disembodied Intermediate State** (Moreland, Plantinga, Cooper...)
2. **Immediate Resurrection View** (Tim O'Connor, Hud Hudson, Kevin Corcoran, suggested by van Inwagen): At death one gains a resurrected body.
 - a. This sits with Zimmerman's Falling Elevator View.
 - b. Suppose the body is composed of physical parts. At death much of your physical parts are whisked away, but others remain as a corps. The whisked away parts are fused with new resurrection body parts.
 - c. **One problem:** This entails a *closest continuer view of personal identity*, according to which ... This leaves open the real possibility of duplicates.
 - d. **A second problem:** Makes the general resurrection redundant. If we get a resurrected body at death it makes the general resurrection redundant.
3. **Non-Existence Resurrection View** (Trenton Merricks, Nancy Murphy): There is a temporal distance between death and being re-created ex nihilo,
 - a. **Watch example:** when a watch is taken apart it does not exist (there is a temporal gap in its existence), but when it is put back together it exists again.
 - b. **Problem:** this is the most difficult view to defend biblically.
 - c. **Other problems:** identity over time. J. P. thinks it isn't the same watch after it is taken apart.

Hermeneutical Issues

1. We have access to the authorial meaning/intent of the Scripture. We can be aware of the text. Joel Green rejects this.
2. Church history has been dualist for 2,000 years. This places the burden of proof on the non-dualist views. It is suspect that non-dualist views have cropped up just at the time that culture begins to reject dualism.
 - a. Green argues that the early church were misled by Philo to adopt dualism.
 - i. Moreland replies: (i) there were Greek materialist who could have influenced them, but they rejected it for other reasons; and (ii) there is no evidence for Green's claim.
3. Common people all over the world since Neanderthals have been dualists. Moreover, the Pharisees in Jesus' day were dualists.

- a. We ought to interpret the texts based on how the original readers/hearers would have understood them.
4. We should do philosophy with Jesus and what he believed in mind (from Moser's paper).

Biblical Evidence

1. According to Moreland and Cooper, the Bible teaches a dualistic holism with a disembodied intermediary state.
2. The Biblical teaching is not there first and foremost to describe what we are in the metaphysical sense. The emphasis is on functional holism, emphasizing that our different faculties are to function in a unified way in order that we flourish in God's Kingdom.

Old Testament Evidence for the Classical View

1. Isa. 26:14, 19 – At death, our spirits depart from our body and awaits a resurrection body.

The Evidence from Second Temple Judaism

1. Sadducees: Did not believe in life after death.
2. Greek world: Disembodied immortal soul.
3. Pharisees : Disembodied soul awaiting a resurrected body.
4. I Enoch 22:3, 5, and 9 (200BC)
5. 2 Esdres 7:75, 78-80 (late First Century)
6. Josephus, Jewish Wars II, Ch. 8, verses 2 and following.

According to NT Wright the Pharisees

N. T. Wright, *Resurrection of the Son of God* (81-84, 128-134, 142-143, 190-206).

N. T. Wright, *Surprised by Hope* (37, 41, 118-19, 148-52, 162, 171-72).

Key Texts for Substance Dualism

1. Matthew 22:31-37
 - a. The argument here turns on the implicit tense of the OT text, which is in the present. God continues to be the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, which aligns Jesus with the Pharisees view.
2. Matthew 10:28
 - a. Background to this text: 4 Maccabaeus 6:7; 10:18-21 (especially 19); 13:13-17.
 - b. Matthew ... and Luke 23:46 affirm the idea that the soul can leave the body.
3. Acts 23: 6-8
 - a. Paul sides with the Pharisees over the Sadducees regarding the afterlife.
 - b. Spirit in this passage refers to a disembodied human spirit.
 - c. **A question:** why are the angels mentioned here? Likely, it refers to a disembodied human spirit. (Both Wright and Witherington argue for this).
 - d. Great commentary on this is Ben Witherington's commentary on Acts.

4. Hebrews 12:23
 - a. Reference of coming to heaven. Human beings in an intermediate states as spirits. The most natural way to understand this text is to
 - b. This passage links up with Revelation 6:9, which describes people as being souls.
 - c. Revelation 20:4 likewise describe life in the intermediate state as a disembodied soul.

Disputed Texts

1. Luke 16:19-31
 - a. Lazarus is in paradise, a term which has two meanings. In 1 Enoch 22 paradise means a disembodied intermediate state. This is how NT Wright understands the NT use of paradise. However, in The Testament of Abraham, paradise refers to the final state after the final resurrection.
2. Luke 23:43
 - a. The thief on the cross refers to the final resurrection or an immediate resurrection body, according to Green. The problem with the final resurrection understanding is the use of phenomenological language
3. 2 Corinthians 5:1-10
 - a. Versus 1-5 is standardly interpreted in light of 6-10, because 6-10 is clearer than 1-5.
 - b. This is standardly understood with reference to being disembodied.
 - c. Green understands nakedness as being exposed to the judgment seat of God. This understanding makes it difficult to understand verses 6-10.

Problems with Joel Green's Book

1. Green gives more authority to neuroscience than to honest exegeses of the text.
2. Green attacks a dualist straw man. He argues that dualism is inconsistent with the interaction of the mind and the brain. Therefore, evidence in favor of interaction is evidence against dualism.
3. Green does not deal with the primary dualist text.

NT Wrights SCP Paper

1. Wright is against an extreme version of anthropological dualism and mistakes contemporary substance dualism as the extreme version.
2. Wright argues that 2 Cor 25 and Acts 23 clearly teach a disembodied intermediary state. Moreover, the 2 Cor 12 passage clearly teach that non-bodily experiences do happen.
3. Wright is against (1) a dualism where the soul is special to God, but the body isn't, (2) a dualism that values the afterlife not on this life, (3) autonomous immortality.

Week 2 – Wednesday, August 31, 2011

Aristotelian Framework: takes a common sense view of natural wholes.

1. A living thing has a special kind of unity different from aggregates, which is fundamental, basic and unified, not built up of more fundamental parts.
2. Living things are continuants; they literally remain the same through change.
3. Substantial change, generation and corruption of objects, is real. It is not the case that all change is accidental.

A key entry point for this discussion is the notion of change, because if you don't have something that is identical through the process you don't have change you have succession.

Constituent analysis: integral parts (a separable part or a substantial part; atomistic analysis) vs. metaphysical parts.

1. The Aristotelian rejects the notion that living things are composed of separable parts.
2. The Aristotelian holds to metaphysical analysis regarding living things.

Prime Mater

Consider accidental change (a Dog going from brown to red). The dog that was brown is now red. What about substantial change (eating an apple, which becomes flesh)? Prime matter, according to the Aristotelian, underlies those kinds of change.

Six Characteristics of Prime Matter

1. Pure potentiality
2. Not sense perceptible and must be inferred from change and form.
3. It is perpetual.
4. It is unformed.
 - a. A form is an essence (a unity of essential properties). Prime matter does not have a particular form essential of its own, but it is always found with form attached to it.
5. It is the same in kind everywhere.
6. It is the principle of every natural change.
 - a. It what underlies change.

(1) and (4) are the unique features of prime mater, which are the most criticized.

*Try to think of prime mater as a homogeneous scattered object.

Note: the arguments for and against prime matter are metaphysics, not empirical.

The Mechanical View Contra Aristotelians

1. Corpuscles, units of matter that are homogeneous that are characterized by prime qualities, ultimate units of extension in space (size and shape).
2. The only kinds of change are mechanical efficient causal changes.
 - a. No teleology.

Two Arguments for the Existence of Prime Matter

The Substratum Thesis: All natural change (excluding God creating ex nihilo) requires a substratum that endures through change.

1. Prime matter is the substratum.
2. Something from the corrupted entity must remain in the generated entity. The generated entity comes out of something in the corrupted entity.
3. This is argued for in virtue of an ex nihilo principle, that in natural processes you cannot get something from nothing.
 - a. Arguments for this principle:
 - i. **Ockham** argued that if something of the generated entity does not take something from the corrupted entity then we have no explanation as to why the corrupted entity went out of existence as the generated entity comes into existence. If you don't have the effect coming from the cause you have an efficient cause not a material cause.
 - ii. **Scotus**' argued that when you have substantial change the corrupting entity ceases to exist before the generated entity comes into existence. If that is the case then there is a temporal gap between the ceasing and coming into being where nothing exists. If that's the case, then we have no explanation as to why the thing that came into existence came into existence rather than something else. According to Scotus, this can be overcome if there is something that overlaps the whole process, the essence of the ceasing entity and the essence of the generated entity.

The Conservations Thesis: Prime matter is naturally conserved through all change.

Arguments Against Prime Matter

1. There seems to be an incoherence in the very notion of prime matter...
 - a. Response: prime matter cannot exist without being completed by something. Prime matter always has some form or other, just no form essentially.
 - b. This seems to be a brute fact. The Aristotelian would have to say that this isn't a difficulty, because all systems have brute facts.

Intrinsic Proper Function

1. For example: a heart that is working the way it ought to work.
2. Proper function has been replaced by
 - a. Statistical frequency: a heart that functions that is typical. This is a non-normative notion of proper function
 - b. Evolutionary survival value: a heart functions to promote the survival of the species.

The Body is Modally Distinct from the Soul

1. Modal distinction: If A is modally distinct from B, then B could exist without A, but A could not exist without B [double check this]
2. The body on this view is mereologically simple.
3. A framework of composition is the wrong framework for asking what a body is, because a body on this view is not composed of parts. They are irreducibly...
4. This view might imply that a hydrogen atom in a cat, for example, is different from one in a human.
5. However, a corpse is not a body, but an aggregate.

Des Chene, chapter 1

Des Chene's concern is to flush out a notion of the soul

Soul

Soul = _{def.} The soul is the unifier, the sustainer, and the teleological director of a things inseparable parts, especially is vital activities.

The Concept of a Living Thing

The concept of being a living thing out to be projected into cases of living things, which don't exist, but do in possible worlds. The concept of life is then projectable. The Aristotelian framework attempts to offer a univocal concept of life.

If living is taken as an equivocal

This is the problem with biochemical definitions of life. It becomes unclear to say what it means for non-biological things to be living (such as God or angels).

On the Aristotelian view, to be a living thing is to have or be a soul; to be a self-mover.

Two kinds of self-motion:

1. Eminent: a causal chain that terminates within the substance it self.
 - a. Example: nourishment or ingesting.

- b. A living thing is not a passive thing through which life flows.
2. Intrinsic: caused by the substance as a first-mover; the origin of the causal chain begins with the substance, not something outside of it.
- a. Example: intellectual action for rational souls or making the body to grow. The soul is the first cause of development.

Week 3

Des Chene: Chapters 2-9

- A. Living Things: are self-movers (in that it is involved in immanent, intrinsic processes).
 - a. Note: Life is not defined with respect to consciousness.

 - B. Vital Power: for example, the power of respiration, excretion, conscious action
 - a. Three Characteristics
 - i. New irreducible properties.
 - ii. Teleological: operates in a system of means to ends.
 - 1. A dog has the vital power to sniff in order that it might find food, eat, ingesting, assimilating and reproduce.
 - a. Note: you can only
 - b. They stand in internal relations
 - iii. They are inseparable parts. They are what they are in virtue of the whole. They function in light of the whole.
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- C. Animals require a complex body in proportion to their diverse and soulish powers. (34)
 - a. A soul is an individuated form instantiated in prime mater. That soul contains an internal structure. That structure is not spatially extended.
 - b. Quantity in the form of extension is the first forms (ontologically, temporally).
 - c. The soul forms the body.
 - d. It follows that the more complicated that souls structure then more complicated the body will be.
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- D. Living and Non-Living Things
 - a. Living things grow by assimilation, but non-living things grow by addition or juxtaposition.
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- E. The Soul: (1) provides the body's **form** (it unites and gives existence and kindness to the body) and (2) **grounds its higher, vital powers**.
 - a. Regarding the unity of a living substance, it's powers come and go and are developed in groups, develop in a regularity, lawlike succession, coordinated among themselves, and ordered teleological towards ends.
 - b. The unity of a things body involves something at a time and something through a time.
 - i. At a time: as an essence, a thing is a unity of inseparable parts, not an aggregate. Change involves the actualization of potentials already present.
 - ii. Through time: as a law, change takes place in regular kind dependant law like way. Caterpillars turn into butterflies, not puppies.

F. Vitalism

- a. A distinctly scientific notion of the nature of life.

G. The Divisibility of the Soul

- a. The soul was conceived as being fully present throughout each part of the body. The soul is present as a whole in the body and in each and every part.
- b. Generating souls by removing a part of a whole. The starfish is an example. This means that purely physical conditions can be

***The take away from this books is that these neo-Aristotelian thinkers where highly sophisticated metaphysicians with a highly developed view of living things.

Week Four — Monday, September 12, 2011

Olson, Chapter 1

Olson lays out the issues and options and what the question means. He also sets this up in a way that is favorable to his view (animalism).

Options Currently On the Table

1. **Biological Organisms:** I am identical to a biological organism; I am identical to an animal; I am identical to a living body (Van Inwagen, Olson).
 - a. The fundamental idea is that there a thing called life (a set activities that are sustaining) and organism (a thing that has parts). The primitive thing here is life; that lives have organisms.

2. **Parts of Animals:** I am not an animal; I am part of an animal.
 - a. *Brains:* I am a brain (or subsection, an atomic simple, of the brain). The price of place on this view is one's conscious life tied to the brain.
 - b. *Temporal Parts:* a four-dimensional view, which holds that

3. **Composed of a Living Body** (Material Constitution View, held by Lynn Baker, Kevin Corcoran): on this view you and your body do not stand in an identity relation.
 - a. draw the distinction between composition and constitution. Composition is a one-many relation that stands between a lump of clay and it's separable parts. The lump of clay and the statue are difference. The lump of clay cannot exist if it goes under part replacement, but the statue can.

4. **Mental Bundles:** You at a point in time are an instantiation of a bundle of mental properties. Through a time you are a succession of mental events. This view is not widely held today.
 - a. Originally made popular by empiricists. This presupposes a bundle theory of substance. Locke said that you have these different properties that a substance has. An apple, for example, has a set of properties. These properties seem to be unified. What provides this unity, according to Locke, is a bare substratum. Later, Hume would hold this view as well as A. J. Ayer.

5. **Simple Immaterial Substances**
 - a. *Cartesian:* I am not identical to any material thing.
 - b. *Thomistic Dualism:* I am a compound object made up of both an immaterial substance and a material organism.
 - c. *Personalism of E. J. Lowe:* Mental entities, physical entities, and persons. Person is a third ontological category that cannot be reduced to mental or physical. A

person is then a simple metaphysical entity that exemplifies personhood. This sometimes goes with a dual-aspect theory. The person is neither mental nor physical.

6. **Novels, Computer Programs:** I am an abstract object; a novel that can be tokened in many different places at once.
7. **We Don't Exist (Nihilism):** The terms 'I' doesn't refer to anything. People don't exist; we don't exist.

The question "What are we?" is nearly identical to the question "What is the referent of the term 'I'?" There are other questions being asked. For example, how is his project related to the mind/body problem? His question is supplemental. The current question has to do with consciousness, but Olson wants to ask the question, 'What am I?'

Section 1.6

How does this question relate to the question of personal identity? According to Olson, the question, 'What am I?' is different than the question, 'What is a person?' We can know what a person is, but fail to know what we are, if we are not essentially a person.

Olson is going against the normal discussions regarding personal identity.

Moreland thinks Olson is correct on this distinction and that there is a proper ordering of these questions. For example, what does it mean for one to persist through time, should come after the question regarding what I am.

Week Five – Monday, September 19, 2011

Olson, Chapter 2

Four Things to Understand about Animalism

1. According to animalism, psychological criteria are neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity or sameness of living things over time.
 - a. For the animalist we are not essentially persons. Being a person is not a natural kind term that we fall under. It is a term that refers to the phase of a living organism.
 - b. It is not *sufficient*, because there are cases of brain fusion, where two things both satisfy the psychological criteria, and should therefore be considered identical, which must be false.
 - c. It is not *necessary*, because a living thing could survive without satisfying the psychological criterion.
 - i. Consider a living organism, its brain is taken out, placed into a dead body, and that body is brought to life.
 1. One could reply that Olson is begging the question, assuming animalism in order to deny psychological continuity.
 2. Olson replies that if one rejects animalism one has to either adopt dualism or the view that two thinker could share the...
 - d. This is an Achilles heel for animalism.
2. The Notion of a Life
 - a. According to van Inwagen: a life is
 - i. homeodynamic [a life is constantly sucking up new parts and dispelling old parts] storm of simples;
 - ii. self-maintaining,
 - iii. well-individuated [for any part p, it is metaphysically determinate as to whether or not that part constitutes a life]
 - iv. jealous event [it seeks to sustain itself and strives to maintain its own identity, form and structure] (composed of smaller events).
 - b. But, how does a life maintain it's identity over time?
 - c. The referent of 'self.' The life itself sustains itself, structure and form.
 - d. Note: lives are self-maintaining. Organisms are not self-maintaining. Rather, it's the life itself that maintains its existence and form.
3. I am identical to an organism or an animal that is "caught up in a life."
 - a. Am I a living body? Olson quibbles about this, but probably, I am a living body on this view.

4. Composition and Continuity of Organisms

- a. The x 's [the atomic simples] compose some y , iff the activities of the x 's constitute y 's life. Accordingly, parthood depends on being caught up in a life.
 - i. If this is taken as a sufficient condition for composition, then you could hold that other composed objects exist (non-living things that have parts that compose them).
 - ii. Van Inwagen turns this into bi-conditions (the iff condition above), which makes him an eliminativist about non-living wholes. The only things that exist for him are atomic simples and living things.
- b. On this view organisms don't have lives, but lives have organisms. Life is primitive and organisms exist in so far as the activities of their parts compose or constitute or are caught up in, a life.
- c. For Olson and van Inwagen, organisms are continuants (literally the same from one moment to the next). Virtually everyone wants to hold this. The problem is being able to do this without thinking we are substances.
 - i. To the degree that we are aggregates of parts, this is going to be hard to defend.
 - ii. O1 and O2, the atomic simples of O1 = x 's and the atomic simples of O2 = y 's. Note that on this view an organism can gain and loose parts and be the same organism provided they are caught up in the same life.

Olson's Argument for Animalism: The Too Many Thinkers Argument [56:00]

The thinking-animal argument:

1. $(\exists x)(x \text{ is a human animal} \ \& \ x \text{ is sitting in your chair})$
2. $(x)((x \text{ is a human animal} \ \& \ x \text{ is sitting in your chair}) \rightarrow x \text{ is thinking})$
3. $(x)((x \text{ is think} \ \& \ x \text{ is sitting in your chair}) \rightarrow x = \text{you})$
4. $(\exists x)(x \text{ is a human animal} \ \& \ x \text{ is you})$

The too-many-thinkers dilemma: Setting dualism aside (in virtue of problems for dualism), the alternative to animalism is a view where a person and an animal (both of which are in the same location) think. *What this means is that it is the rejection of dualism that results in the too-many-thinkers dilemma.*

The Special Composition Question: The x 's compose some w iff what? That is, under what conditions do the atomic simples compose a whole?

Animalist Answer: when the parts are taken up in a life.

Pluralist Answers: Parthood is different for different kinds of wholes.

A Scientific Critique: When scientists define life as self-maintaining, it is the organism that is self-maintaining, not the life that maintains the organism. Therefore, animalism cannot be warranted on scientific grounds, but metaphysical grounds alone.

The Frankenstein Problem: think about a myriad storm of activities (billions upon billions of atomic simples involved in thousands of activities). The sum total of those activities do not occur throughout your life, because some are taken up and other drop away. Suppose that there is some subset of those activities such that they are necessary and sufficient, not for life, but for the organism to exist. The number of activities for there to be an organism is n . Suppose you have a carcass, and God is one by one adding atomic simples until being just shy of one ($n-1$). When God adds the activities of that final atomic simple (n) the organism comes into exist. Now there seems to be a problem with this, because there is no metaphysical significance between having $n-1$ atomic simples behaving in a certain way and having n atomic simples behaving in a certain way. The two cases don't differ in a metaphysically significant way.

Olson, Ch2

Moreland's Objections to Olson

1. It is plausible to think that organisms have lives; that is, that the organism is primitive, not lives. This move helps to shift the burden of proof. Alone it leaves the debate in a stalemate.
2. **A Scientific Critique:** It seems that when scientist describe life, the organism is self-sustaining, not life.
3. **The Frankenstein Problem:** see notes from the previous class.
4. **A Unity of Consciousness Critique:** Hasker, in *The Waning of Materialism*, argues whenever a complex object accomplishes f , there is always a reductive analysis available: f can always be broken down into sub-functions (receiving the inputs, generating an output...), such that each part of the complex object will perform one of those sub-functions. Accordingly, its parts do non-identical things that contribute to the function of the whole.
 - a. Given this, Moreland argues that (1) organisms are too complex to think, (part of the unity of consciousness argument, David Barnett) and (2) if a physical object can think the organism is the wrong object.
 - b. Olson has a response: whenever we say that a brain thinks the proper way to respond is that I think with my brain. The thinker is the organism and the organism uses the brain to think,
 - i. Moreland replies: whenever an animalist says, "I think with the brain" a reductive paraphrase is possible: I am a whole with a part that thinks. This is in line with Hasker.
 - ii. Note: This thinking problem is not going to go away. The question must be asked: what is the best candidate for being a thinker. This is going to come down to whether Olson's critique of the brain view is sufficient to sustain the animalist intuition.
 - iii. Keep in mind: Do his criticisms of the brain view equally apply to his animalist view?

Mereological Essentialism

1. Mereological Essentialism: a thing's identity is constituted by its separable parts. Just about everyone wants to avoid ME, because it follows that objects as depicted by the physicalist are not continuants.

- a. ME seems to be both intuitive and counter-intuitive.
 - i. Intuitive, because when we think of a pile of nails and remove some nails, we think of the pile as being different.
 - ii. Counter-intuitive, because we tend to think of objects (commonsensical) as simple (maybe having atomic parts), even when they are not. [Moreland and Barnett]
- 2. Olson tries to defeat ME by arguing that the structure of an organism, although its parts are replaced, maintains continuity in virtue of maintaining its structure.
 - a. Moreland replies that this instantiated structure seems to be some kind of collection of separate relation instances. Therefore, as parts are replaced, so are the relation instances, even if they are the same. The problem then is that the structure seems to be a mereological aggregate, just as much as the parts. The relation instance is a sum of the relation instances in flux. If that is right, it is hard to see how the structure can avoid ME, because it is constantly gaining and losing members just as the parts are.
 - i. How can the materialist reply to Moreland?

Why Aren't Hurricanes Alive?

- 1. There seems to be non-living organisms that satisfy the animalist's criteria for living things.

Near Death Experiences?

- 1. If NDE are true then it must be the case that the organism isn't what thinks, because the organism is dead during NDE.
- 2. One problem with naturalistic explanations of NEDs is that in many of these cases the patients gain new knowledge while they were dead.

Analysis of Chapter Two

- 1. What is an animal?
 - a. Olson says they are substances by identifying them as concrete particulars. Moreland thinks this is too quick and needs more work.
 - b. Why believe animalism? Olson offers the too many thinkers problem.
 - c. Olson offers three alternatives:
 - i. Animalism
 - ii. There is an animal there, but it doesn't think as you do.
 - 1. Olson admits that dualism avoids the too many thinkers view.
 - a. Olson argues that dualism is susceptible to problems.
 - b. One objection is that the dualist holds that animals can't think, but doesn't tell us why.

- i. Dualism can argue that thinking is not a physical process or event [Leibniz' Mill].
 - ii. Secondly, the animal is complex and not simple.
 - iii. T [David Lewis' View]
 2. An animal gives an account of persistence over time, but not the persistent conditions of a person over time.
 - a. But now what do you do with angels?

Two Main Things in Chapter Two

1. He provides three main alternatives to animalism: ME, dualism, Lewis' View.
2. Animalism is not the majority view, because most employ psychological criteria for personal identity over change. Olson must attack the psychological criteria view. This is a huge burden. He spends a good bit of time in this chapter doing this. The thing he must pull off is to make those arguments against PC that the dualist cannot use.

Week Six Monday, September 26, 2011

Olson, Chapter 3

Three Essential Characteristics of Constitutionalism

1. Two or more things can coincide materially yet have different properties (sharing all their separable parts in common).
 - a. Mereological Sum
 - i. Suppose sets are real (they are a collection of members). On this view a set is a single unified abstract object. A set exists when and only it exists when its members exist. If the members change spatial location it does not alter the set.
 - ii. A mereological sum would just be a kind of unified collection of parts totally irrespective of their structure and relation to one another. The MS can be viewed as shapeless or at least without a particular shape.
 - iii. The idea is that you can have a lump of clay that would then constitute a statue. In such a case you would then have two objects that are physically coincident at the same time with the same properties.
 - iv. Moreland rejects mereological sums.
2. We non-animals coincide with some human animal or other, or at least some material object or other.
 - a. There seems to be an ontological independence between the constituting object and the object being constituted. But, there seems to be an ontological dependence for the constituted object on the constituting object.
3. We have certain mental properties essentially, so that you and I are essentially persons.
 - a. We are constituted by certain mental properties. Two possibilities:
 - i. First-person point of view.
 - ii. Satisfying some psychological criterion of personal identity.

Moreland's Objections

1. Moreland is suspicious that a first-person point of view is a property. Moreland thinks a reductive analysis such that to say that something has a FPPV is to say that thing is a personal kind of viewing point (substance). Therefore, for

something to have a FPPV is for that thing to be a person... The question is then... Moreland thinks that

2. On this view, a living body constitutes a living body, with the new property of having the first person point of view. But, why not just get rid of the second object and consider the first object as gaining an emergent property?
 - a. Persons have persistent conditions that wouldn't be true if the...

The Major Argument that Olson Offers for Constitutionalism

It solves problems of material constitution

1. The Clay Statue Problem
 - a. You have the statue and the lump of clay
2. Tibbles and Tibbs the Cat.
 - a. Tibbles = the cat, Tibbs = the cat without a tale.

Criticisms of Constitutionalism

1. **Lumpism:** Statues do not exist, just lumps of clay shaped like statues.
 - a. **Olson's Reply:** although this might work on statues, it doesn't work for living things. If you use parallel reasoning with living things, they cannot survive the squashing.
 - i. Moreland replies, that the lumpist can explain the parallel easily. The dog gets squashed and does not survive in virtue of the same reason the statue does not survive: its shape is radically altered.
 - ii. Further, Olson misses to points about lumpism:
 1. It is not the case that the lumpist is committed to the non-existence of statues.
 2. The lumpist could shift analysis when it comes to living things and deal with them with souls.
 - b. **Moreland's View:** statues are constituted by the intentions of the artist or culture. A statue is not identical to a Thatcher shaped lump of clay. His view is close to lumpism, with this addendum. Statues come into existence, but there is only one object, the lump of clay that is now taken to represent Thatcher. Moreland does not think there is a constitution relation, but a composition relation.
 - i. Olson is wrong that statues do not exist on the lumpist view.

- ii. A lump of clay is identical to a set of atomic simples, secondary qualities...It follows that there is no such thing as an unshaped lump of clay.
- iii.

Week Six Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Olson, Chapter 3 continued.

Criticisms of Constitutionalism

1. **Statuism:** there are no such things as mereological sums, such as a lump of clay. Dominant kinds view: the dominant kind (the statue) overrides the dominated kind (the clay). On this view you have a new object that comes into existence (the statue), not two things that exist (the lump of clay and the statue).
 - a. **Olson's Reply:** what we have is a collection of inorganic particles that compose a statue when they are arranged in a certain way. You would think the same thing is true of living things. Once those organic parts are put in the correct arrangement you should get Margret Thatcher. But, the statue is subject to mereological essentialism, which would then apply to Margret Thatcher. However, living things are continuants, not mereological essentials.
 - i. **Moreland's reply:** The constitutionalist (Corcoran) will reply that statues get their persistence conditions from...**Moreland** argues that statues retain their persistence through part replacement in a popular sense, but not a strict sense.
 - ii. **Moreland's second reply:** Olson's rejection of Statuism, that if you apply these notions to living things there are problems. Moreland think that one can hold that there are two distinct notions of persistence conditions, one for living and one for non-living things.
2. **Eliminativist View/Sparse Ontology:** there is a collection of atomic simples arranged clay wise, and for the statue there is a collection of atomic simples arranged statue wise. This view flows from the nature of composition and atomism.
 - a. **Peter Unger:** There is no ontologically difference between lumps of statues and living persons, so that if lumps and statues go, so do persons. If you are going to be an eliminativist regarding non-living things, but hold that living things are substantive, you are going to have to ground this in some kind of dualism.

Two Further Arguments for Constitutionalism (pp.59-60)

1. The Replacement Puzzle

2. The Amputation Puzzle

- a. You have a living thing Peter, and a living thing Pete.
- b. Constitutionalist Solution: after the operation you have two objects that are not identical to each other.
- c. Dualist Solution: there is no such thing as Pete, or at best is a biological part of Peter's body or a mode of Peter's soul.

Three Objections for the Constitutionalist

1. **The Counting Problem:** It seems like it gets the wrong answer about how many people are in the world. The constitutionalist holds that every time there is a constituted object with a point of view there is a person.
 - a. **Olson** argues that an object with disparate mental states, that is, does not have a unified conscious life, but has psychological continuity. There seems to be a person there, but the constitutionalist fails to count this as a person.
 - i. **Moreland** reject that there is not a person in such cases.
 - ii. Notice how important having a unified consciousness seems to be to our intuitions about persons, as opposed to material constitution.
2. **The Too-Many-Thinkers Problem:** if you are going to say that the person is thinking are you going to say the animal is not thinking? It looks like there are two thinkers. The animal and the person are indistinguishable.
 - a. **Baker's Solution:** she distinguishes between derivative (a property something has in virtue of what it constitutes that does have that property non-derivatively) and non-derivative property (has it in virtue of being itself).
 - b. **Moreland's Reply to Baker:** The problem can be altered to: Why does the animal not think in itself, but only think derivatively? If the things are not physically indistinguishable, why suppose that one of them is the derivative thinker and not the non-derivative thinker.
3. **The Constitution-Inducing Problem:** a constitution inducing property is such that if that property is exemplified you know you have a new object with that property. The difficulty is that you do not want to have objects popping into existence randomly.

Week Seven October 3, 2011

Kevin Corcoran, *Rethinking Human Nature*

Material Constitution: First, Corcoran tries to establish material constitution by providing examples and stating two necessary conditions for material constitution.

1. Two necessary conditions for material constitution:

- a. Wholly material coincident.
- b. Members of different natural kinds.

2. Criticisms

- a. How do you have different 'kinds' that are composed to the same mater? Corcoran talks about this regarding specific examples (p. 66).
- b. His examples in this section are not analogous. The relation between the statue and the marble or the dollar bill and the paper is a realization relation. There is some other relation between the mass of cells and the organism. But that isn't the same relation (constitution) across all cases.
- c. There is a solution to these problems that avoid constitutionalism.
- d. Is the different natural kinds assertion ad hoc? Why couldn't a lump of clay constitute a lump of clay? Why do they have to be two different natural kinds? One might reply that we observe it? But that doesn't seem to be true.

Persons Constituted by Bodies: Secondly, he wants to establish that persons are not bodies but, rather are constituted by bodies.

1. Regarding **persons**, Corcoran maintains that persons have *points of view*, and human persons are *essentially constituted by their bodies*.

a. Criticisms

- i. What does he do with the evidence for NDE, and the possibility of body switch cases?
- ii. Corcoran assumes that a point of view is a property. What is it that has this property? Whatever has it must be what it is independent (Conceptually and ontologically) of having that property. If he says it's the person, then the person is what it is prior to exemplifying that property. If it is the brain, then why not

go with animalism, where the first-person point of view is an emergent property. Is the constituted object called a person needed here? It doesn't seem so.

2. Regarding **bodies**, he says they are living animals.
 - a. Living organism (similar to VanInwagen).
 - b. Whose persistent conditions are captured by the immanent causal condition (ICC): a state x of a thing A brings about a subsequent state y of A [this is similar to the Medieval notion of internal or intrinsic causation].
 - c. A human body B at time t_3 , is the same as A at t_1 , iff the temporal stages from A to B satisfy the ICC.
 - d. **Criticisms:**
 - i. Goetz argues that ICC is circular. For imminent causation to occur the cause and effect states have to have sameness of object.
 - ii. The relata has to stand in some relation.
 - iii. Moreland argues that he confuses what it is to persist with what causes something to exist.
 - iv. If Corcoran is right then the first stage of the post-mortem body cannot be identical to the pre-mortem body, because the very first instance of the...
 - v. If ICC is right, it entails that occasionalism is not metaphysically possible. However, it seems that occasionalism is metaphysically possible, and perhaps even actual.
 - vi. This view faces the closest continuer problem. At death some of the particles stay with the corpse, and others leave to constitute a new body. The reason I am constituted by this body, as opposed to the corpse, is because this body is a living body. But, suppose God decides to reanimate the corpse particles rather than the other particles. Then I would be that person. It all depends on what God decides to animate, one or the other or both at the same time.
 - vii. If his view is correct the corpse would have to lose weight. The fewer the particles God whisks away, the less plausible Corcoran's view seems.

Fission at Death: At death we are composed of all these parts. Suppose that God

Persons cannot be their bodies because they have different persistent conditions. The persistence of a body does not require reference to mental states.

Problems

0. (p. 72-73) Corcoran moves from a single causal relation to a plurality of causal relations. In what sense is this immanent causation?

Week Seven October 5, 2011

Lynn Rudder Baker, "Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age" *Internal Journal of Philosophy of Religion* 70 (2011): 47-59.

Type-I Materialism: I cannot exist without my body.

Type-II Materialism: I cannot exist without some body or other that supports certain mental functions.

Baker is committed to the following:

1. All objects and properties either existed at the creation or are constituted by things at the creation.
 - a. What follows:
 - i. Everything will be composed or constituted of parts.
 - ii. All properties will be structural properties; there are no sui generis new properties.
2. Constitution is an arrangement of objects.
3. Human persons are constituted by living organism.
 - a. This is consistent with Corcoran's view. She doesn't say that living organisms necessarily constitute human persons.
4. A thing's primary kind (person) confers on it causal powers that its constituent (being a human organism) wouldn't have if it didn't constitute anything.
 - a. These causal powers signal the presence of a new object. There are no emergent properties.
 - b. This seems like a causal theory of existence.
 - c. **A problem:** when you identify a new range of properties that the constituted object has, it is open to the animalist to say that these are emergent properties.
 - i. Baker might argue that we should be constitutionalist about this because of the problem of being a continuant. If we treat these as an emergent property then it just treats them as phases of things.
 - ii. The animalist could respond: we can help our selves to psychological criteria for personal identity for persistence, but what we are doing is just talking about the phase of some thing not the thing itself.
5. Baker uses a derivative/non-derivative distinction.

- a. There are two ways of having a property on this view.
 - b. Objection 1: Why is it two physically indistinguishable things do not have the same properties?
 - i. Baker holds that the person has a certain weight, because that person is constituted by the object (the body/animal) that has that certain weight non-derivatively.
 - c. Objection 2: According to Moreland, you can paraphrase the distinction in such a way that it doesn't mean anything. Suppose we say that the lump of clay doesn't have aesthetic properties, it is just related to a thing that does.
6. Being constituted by this body is not necessary or essential to my persistence.
7. **Implication for her view:**
- a. Not all physical aggregates are of...
 - i. Drivers license example:
 - b. Constitutionalism is not property-dualism (51).
 - c. Mind is just a menagerie of abilities we group together.
 - i. This sounds like functionalism.
 - d. Baker thinks her view avoids mereological essentialism.
 - i. There is a problem for the unity of consciousness, because on her view there is no single thing that has
 - e. She claims that her view takes science seriously (51).
8. Baker then asks how is her view consistent with Christian doctrine?

Week Eight October 10, 2011

“The mind is an embodied and relational process, emerging from within and between brains, that regulates the flow of energy and information.” Daniel Siegel

Olson, Ch. 4

The Brain View: you are identical to a brain or a functioning brain.

Virtues of the Brain View

1. The brain view makes sense of the intuitions regarding brain transplant thought experiments.
2. The brain view solves the thinking animal problem. There is no thinking animal, only the brain thinks.
3. On the brain view we can remain the same and still undergo gain and loss of body parts, because on this view
 - a. Criticism:
 - i. I can remain the same even if my brain undergoes change.
 - ii. There are cases of individuals who only have 20% of a brain, yet are still persons.
4. **The thinking brain problem** (p. 79).
 - a. Thought implies a thinker. The thing that thinks is the brain. But, I am also a thinker. Therefore, I am a brain.
 - (1) There is such a thing as my brain.
 - (2) My brain thinks my thoughts in the strict sense.
 - (3) If my brain thinks my thoughts in the strict sense, then anything else
 - b. Criticisms of (2):
 - i. Olson replies that thinkers do not have other thinkers as proper parts. No thinker is a sum of other thinkers. My brain can't be a thinker because my brain is a part of me. [This appears to be an animalist rejection. He assumes that
 - ii. The brain view can respond that if you take the brain and put it in a vat, it seems to be a thinker. If you argue that the brain can't be a thinker in a body, then you must hold that what makes the brain a thinker is its environment. Note: the argument isn't in regard to what is causally need for it to think.
 - c. Criticism regarding identity considerations

- i. If Einstein is a brain, then Einstein is in Kansas.
- ii. The brain seems to have different persistent conditions than I do, because it could become inorganic, but I could not.
 - 1. Why couldn't I?
- iii. Reply: I am a functioning brain.
 - 1. Olson replies that this results in a change of view, such as constitutionalism.
 - 2. Moreland does think Olson's reply works. Why couldn't the brain view hold that I am a phase of my functioning brain?

5. Further Criticisms Olson Does Not Raise

- a. What is function?
- b. If one person has more or better functioning are they more of a person. Brain function seems to be a degreed thing, but persons are all or nothing things. That is, we seem to be natural kinds of things not processes.

6. Olson's Main Criticism of the Brain View

- a. The brain view is unprincipled. The reason we think we are functioning brains, because brains are directly involved in thinking. TSM: something counts as a part of a thinker iff it is directly involved in producing thought. But TSM cannot be true, because there are brain parts that are not involved in thinking and non-brain parts that are involved in thinking. There seems to be a problem of specifying the boundaries of what directly produces thinking.
- b. According to Olson, the problem is that parts of the body are all interacting with each other, some of which are not doing so in the right kind of way. Let's then say that what is relevant is that thing that directly produces thought in the right way [this is some kind of psychological individuation principle]. But, then why not hold that there is in the brain as many selves as opposed to a unified self?

Week Eight October 12, 2011

Olson, Ch. 4, part 2

Thinking subject minimalism: The parts of a thinker must be directed involved in its thinking. X is a part of a thinker iff x is directly involved in that thinker's thinking.

The psychological individuation principle: Thoughts belong to the same thinker iff they can causally interaction with each other and no other thinker's thoughts.

1. How is this not necessary?
 - a. Counterexamples: Idle thoughts: a thought that jumps into your mind and then leaves your mind.
2. How is this not sufficient?
 - a. Two brains wired together that are causally interacting with each other. Therefore, these two brains wired together are now one thinker. But, this seems strange, because the unity of consciousness seems to be an issue of being instantiated by a single individual, not being causally connected.
 - b. It seems possible that occasionalism is true, so that there are not causally interacting between thoughts, but there are still individual thinkers.

*It seems that if PI principle is true, then we could have the brains of two individuals, Steve and Gary, wired together and 'they' perform some action together. Now, imagine that we interview Steve, and ask him to explain what just happened. It seems reasonable to conclude that Steve could explain what happened without reference to personal explanation, but rather causal explanation. Moreover, we could as well. However, personal causal explanation with special reference to intentions is a central component to mental life.

This chapter is pointing at the issue of the brain being composed of several parts, as opposed to simplicity of the self.

Barnett, “You are Simple”

Barnett begins with **The Datum**: pairs of people are incapable of being subjects of experience/thought. Barnett wants to know why the datum is true.

He then argues that there are six possible explanations of explaining the datum.

- (1) **The Number Explanation**: The reason a pair of people don't think is that there are not enough members.
 - a. Barnett replies that you could add more and more people, but they would still fail to be a subject of thought.
- (2) **The Relation Explanation**: Perhaps these two people do not stand in the correct relation to one another. He offers a casual dispositional relation
 - a. **Barnett's response**: with a thought experiment where two people are shrunk down and placed into Paul McCartney's right and left hemisphere that are related
- (3) **The Nature Explanation**: Perhaps pairs of people lack the necessary nature to be consciousness.
 - a. **Barnett's response**: it doesn't matter what kinds of things you pair together, *a* and *b*, in order for you to know if *a* and *b* are conscious, you need more information. However, you do know *a priori* that the combination of *a* and *b* cannot be a single subject of consciousness/thought/experience.
- (4) In order for this to be a better argument, Barnett needs to offer evidence for how we know that Barnett's response is true.
- (5) **The Structure Explanation**:
- (6) **The Combination of 1-4 Explanation**: “Perhaps a pair of people cannot itself be conscious because it is a collection resulting from the mere existence of two particular people, whereas a conscious being is a structure resulting from many organs, or billions of cells, or quadrillions of particles, standing to one another and their environment in certain causal-dispositional relations.” (165)
 - a. **Barnett's Initial Reply**: One way to understand this is to consider a body as a conscious thing by conceiving of bodies as simple. But, that seems obviously false. Bodies are made of myriads of parts.
 - b. **Barnett's Main Reply**: Barnett works to eliminate every combination of Number, Relation, Nature and Structure.
 - i. *Number*:
 - ii. *Nature*: The ‘Give a Neuron a Break Day’ Experiment.
 - iii. *Relation*:
 - iv. *Structure*:
- (7) **The Simple Solution**:

Barnett thinks that his argument provides strong reason to reject physicalism, especially because the dualist can respond to the arguments for physicalism as merely establishing correlation relations between mind and brain, not identity.

Mereological essentialism is a metaphysical notion that applies only to composed things. According to Moreland, people who hold to the material constitution view end up treating bodies as blobs, rather than collections of a myriad of parts standing in external relations.

His basic conclusion is that the subject of consciousness is simple not composed of separable proper parts. This allows however, that the soul can have non-separable yet metaphysically distinct parts.

Barnett claims that if I tell you I have 2 objects, *a* and *b*, you know *a priori* that the pair isn't conscious.

Barnett is advancing the intuition that the subject of experience is simple.

The question is: where do we get this intuition? Moreland's essay "Substance Dualism and the Argument from Self-Awareness" addresses this.

Week Nine, October 17, 2011

Hasker, “Persons and the Unity of Consciousness” in *The Waning of Materialism*

Overview of Hasker’s Argument

We have a concept of our selves as subjects of experience and rational selves as a unified center of consciousness. However, there are scientific experiments that seem to go against this notion. Hasker argues, on the basis of his unity of consciousness argument, that we are partless spiritual substances. The Cartesian fails to explain the scientific experiments, because there are no internal divisions within a Cartesian substance. Hasker contends that his Emergentism view does, because there can be a division of consciousness on his view.

Do we have a conception of ourselves as a unified consciousness? Yes. What is Hasker’s argument?

Multi-personality Cases

Moreland does not find the multi-personality cases problematic. In order for them to pose a problem they would have to be simultaneous, but there seems to be no clinical evidence for simultaneity. Rather, it seems that people quickly go back and forth.

Commissurotomy Cases

The commissurotomy cases do have to be dealt with. But, there can be various ways of interpreting the data. Hasker argues that in order to handle these cases you have to have a soul that can be fragmented with respect to difference streams or centers of consciousness.

Moreland thinks Hasker is unfair to the Cartesian view, because a classic view of substance allows for the substance to be complex, and therefore has more resources than Hasker seems to recognize.

Hasker’s Unity-of-consciousness Argument

Hasker is arguing against a holism in (2) and (4).

Hasker thinks that (4) is likely to be the premise that would be rejected.

Criticisms of Hasker's Argument

Premise One (p. 182)

There is a problem with premise (1) of Hasker's argument. The second half of the premise is not the same as the first.

Premise Two

Andrew Bailey has suggested that Hasker's argument leaves room for the materialist to adopt animalism to hold onto (2), but reject (4).

Appendix: Bayne and Chalmers on the Split-brain View

Access-consciousness: a conscious state that is available to the subject for various purposes, such as reasoning.

Phenomenal consciousness: a conscious state that has a "what its like to be in that state experience." Moreland and others think all conscious states have phenomenal consciousness. Other, such as Kim, denies this.

Considering cases, such as the matrix case...

Moreland has sympathy for the Bayne and Chalmers thesis.

Week 10, Monday, October 24, 2011

Temporal Parts / 4-D View

Olson, Chapter 5

Persons are 4-dimensional chunks of matter. At any given moment I am not a person, but a stage of a person.

For x to have a property F at a time t is for (x at t) to have F tenselessly.

Most advocates of this view would say you are identical to your history. If that is the case it follows that I couldn't have had a different history. Counterpart theory offers a response to this issue.

The 4-D view denies enduring through change. Change is rather static succession.

Three Reasons for the 4-D View

1. This is a natural way to interpret Special Relativity (Minkowski's view). [Olson does not offer this reason.]
2. It solves the problem of temporary intrinsics.
3. Solves problems of material composition, while avoiding dualism and constitutionalism. [Moreland this is the strongest argument for the view.]

The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics: The problem of a thing changing its properties.

1. **The 4-D Solution:** the object isn't F and G , but one part of the object is F at one time and G at another: x at t_1 is F ; x at t_2 is G . This avoids the contradiction that x is both F and G , which is against Leibniz's Law.
2. **Olson's Solution:** The same object has F at t_1 and G at t_2 .
3. **The Commonsense View:** We move through time and have these properties at different times; an A-Series view of time, where temporal becoming is real.
 - a. **Olson's Criticism:** to say that x has F at t_1 , and G at t_2 turns F and G into relations between x and t_1 and t_2 : " x is F at t_1 " = def. x stands in the F relation to t_1 . This means that these properties are no longer intrinsic to x , but mere relations.

- b. **Moreland's Response:** a thing having a property at a time is not a relation. Rather, there are objects that have accidental properties. Jones has the accidental property [sitting] and he has that in the context [at noon]. Time provides the ontological framework for things to have or lose or gain intrinsic properties. Time is not literally an attribute, but an ontological space the object is placed in.
 - i. On Moreland's view, to be in time is to undergo temporal becoming, which is primitive and not a property.

The Problem of Material Constitution

1. **The 4-D view:** The statue is a temporal slice of a lump, like being a teenager. Hudson argues that a person is a temporal part of a living organism.
 - a. On this view, you can also have a statue composed of different lumps (the statue undergoes part replacement).
 - i. This is the Tibs/Tibbles Problem: after the cutting they overlap.
 - b. More thinks this view solves problem better than the constitutionalist view does.
 - c. However, this view is highly counterintuitive.

The Problem of Modal Incompatibility: The same identical object has incompatible modal properties.

1. Consider the statue/lump case. The lump and the statue are identical at a time on the 4-D view. However, the statue can be squashed and the lump cannot.
2. **Counterpart Theory:** for some object to be potentially F is for there to be another possible world where that object has a twin that is literally F.
 - a. **Example:** To say that I could have been a lawyer is to say that I have a counterpart that is a lawyer.
 - b. **Olson** argues that the 4-D view must appeal to counterpart theory in order to deal with the problem of modal incompatibility. They must offer a reductive analysis of what it means to have modal properties.

Problems with Personal Identity

1. **Popular 4-D view:** 4-D + psychological criteria: a person is a 4-dimensional hunk of matter that is a maximal psychological continuer (a series of temporal stages that stand in the relevant psychological relation to each other and no other stages).

2. **Olson's Criticism:**

- a. **Brain Transfer Machine:** a machine that can suck your psychology out of your brain, store it in a computer and then put it into another brain.

Who counts as the person, the first brain, the second brain, both?

- i. **Moreland** doesn't see this as unanswerable for the 4-D view. They can reply that all that this shows is that the conjunction of 4-D and some psychological criterion is not sufficient for personal identity.

What is needed is more detailed account of the psychological continuity principle.

- 1. The problem is that once these details are spelled out they will fail due to counterexamples.

Week 11 Monday, October 31

Olson, Ch 6

The Bundle Theory

The first bundle theorist was George Barkley. Early bundle theory was grounded in empiricisms and a sense data view. Denies that there is a substance that stands under anything. Barkley opts for a bundle theory for material objects, while Hume expanded the bundle theory to persons.

Bundle Theory = _{def.} You are identical to a bundle of mental properties and through time you are a series or success of bundles.

A Major Question: What is it that unifies a bundle?

Three major answers:

- (1) **A causal interaction theory** according to which mental properties are members of the same bundle just in case they can causally interact with the other members of a bundle.
 1. **Problem 1:** the causal interaction criterion is not necessary. It seems that God could give me an idle thought that is epiphenomenal. What would make that thought mine? To begin with, I exemplify that thought.
 2. **Problem 2:** the causal interaction criterion is not sufficient. I can conceive of a telepathy situation where my thought directly causally interacts with your thoughts. Demonic example.
- (2) **That they stand in the bundle relation** (Moreland thinks this is the most promising answer). A bundle is not a list, but a unity of mental properties, which just consist in all the members of the bundle standing in a bundle relationship.
- (3) **The relation of co-location:** A bundle is unified by a primitive relation of being co-located.

Olson argues that if you are going to be a bundle theorist about mental properties it is usually in virtue of being one regarding material object.

Arguments for the Bundle Theory that Olson Deals With

- (1) **The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity:** sameness of person consists in sameness of satisfying psychological criteria.
 - a. **What exactly is this criterion highlighting?** What does it pick out?
It turns out to be mental properties. Olson argues that the bundle theory provides an ontological grounding for the psychological criterion for personal identity.
- (2) **Counting Persons:** We seem to count persons in terms of unified mental systems of mental states (the psychological individuation principle).
 - a. Olson thinks that physicalism is inconsistent with the PIP, because if you are a physicalist about the bearer of consciousness then you are going to identify the thinker with the animal, the brain, ext. However, subsystems of the brain, animal ext. should be counted as thinkers as well.

Reid's Criticism (Olson, pp. 139-41)

- (1) On the bundle view thought think, but thoughts aren't thinkers no matter how many you add together. The thoughts and the thinker are not distinct.
 - a. Moreland responds: for a thinker to think just is for it to have a thought as a member of the properties that are bundled together.
- (2) But this argument could be understood to be stating that there is a problem of agency, because bundles seem to be passive, while thinkers are not.
 - a. O'Connor view
- (3) Olson argues against the claim that for the thinker to think is just to have a thought, then if one thought is sufficient to count a thinker it follows that there are different thinkers for every thought. Otherwise, you would be committed to the view that a certain number of thoughts constitute a thinker, but that seems problematic.

Olson's Thinking Animals Problem Once More (Olson, pp. 141-143)

- (1) The bundle theorists say you are identical to a bundle of mental properties. However, it looks like the animal is the thinker. So, which is the thinker, the bundle or the animal?

Another Argument from Olson

- (1) If properties are universals, then it seems that bundles of properties are universals, but I am not a universal, I am a particular, therefore, I am not a bundle of properties.
- (2) The reply would be something in virtue of the co-location or compresence.

Week Eleven, Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Olson, Chapter 7, The Soul

Soul

According to Olson, Souls = def. are exhausted by mental properties and are metaphysical simples. Thomist's would add that souls also have properties of life.

Olson's Three Key Arguments for Dualism

1. **The Divisibility Argument:** thinking things are not divisible, but material things are capable of being divided into parts. Therefore, thinkers must be simple.
 - a. **Olson's Criticism:** We cannot know that we are not divisible unless we know that we are not physical, and is therefore question begging.
 - b. **Moreland's Reply:** The physicalist is the one begging the question. The dualist is starting with the evidence of intuitions regarding the self, not presupposing dualism.

2. **The Argument from Disembodied Survival:** (This has been championed by Charles Taliaferro).
 - a. **Olson's Criticism:** Similar to his criticism to (1), this argument assumes dualism.
 - b. **Moreland's Reply:** same as (1.b).

3. **The Inadequacy-of-physicalism Argument:** Olson claims that the argument is that we cannot conceive of how material objects could give rise to (cause) consciousness.
 - a. **Olson's Criticism:** we cannot conceive of how either a material or immaterial thing could produce consciousness.
 - b. **Moreland's Reply:** This isn't the dualist argument. The argument should be how could a material thing *be* conscious.
 - i. .
 - ii. Unity Problem: it seems like the physicalist views amount to complex arrangements of parts. How are they unified?

Dualism & The Thinking Animal Problem

Olson admits that dualism solves the thinking animal problem: the animal doesn't think, so there is no thinking animal problem (p. 153).

The Paradox of Increase

The dualist holds that we have a commonsense intuition that we are the same

Mereological Constancy: A thing cannot gain parts and remain the same.

$$\begin{array}{c} A \ B \ \rightarrow \ CB \\ A \end{array}$$

Olson accepts mereological constancy, but he looks at counterarguments to it. One way to rebut the MC argument is to deny the existence of C, as follows:

$$\begin{array}{c} DEF \ B \ \rightarrow \ DEF B \\ A \qquad \qquad A \end{array}$$

Deny C and replace it with atomic simples. Olson doesn't think this works and Moreland thinks this just pushes the problem somewhere else.

Another way to get rid of C, that Olson doesn't mention, is to get rid of C and B, we conceive of A and B as an ontological blob, such that A grows with the addition of B. Moreland replies that A and B are still distinct with respect to their properties and regions.

Olson grants mereological constancy and asks if that alone entails dualism, and answers no. This is because there are two materialist views that are consistent with MC: a mereological sum view, and that you are a series of mereological stages (sets of physical parts) where you become a success of masses. Olson avoids dualism...

Objections to Dualism

1. **Causal Paring Problem:** What "pairs up" souls with bodies?
 1. Moreland's Responses
 - a. **Causation is not essentially spatial**, such as bringing about or...
 - b. Opt for **singular causation**: a particular can bring about a cause on another particular in virtue of being a particular.

- c. **Aristotelian/Thomistic reply:** find an ontological ground for causal interaction that is more primitive than causal interaction, perhaps through the informing or animating relation. The soul picks out which body is its in virtue of being that body that it informs or animates, and causation takes place in virtue of this informing and animating.
 - d. **Ontological space:** there is a metaphysical matrix that is not special and have an ontological counterpart to location, from which causation is directed at a body and vice-versa (Tim O'Connor's solution). The problem is how is this more than an analogy.
 - e. You can **locate the soul where the body is** at and give it a spatial relation. This raises another problem: if you hold that the soul is located in every part of the body, then you will have to index causation—the soul caused in the hand a pain and later caused in the foot a pain. Moreland thinks this view is promising.
2. **The Remote-Control Argument:** if the soul is causally connected with the body it must be in virtue of some remote control device. Suppose we have a remote control device causing a material object. If something breaks down in the material object the causal connection breaks down, but it doesn't affect the internal workings of the remote control itself. Damage to the brain should not keep the soul from thinking and all of its internal processes.
- 1. **Moreland replies:** we are unable to know *a priori* what can cause what or the details of causal interactions. Therefore, we do not know *a priori* how the mind and the brain interact. The Thomist has a deeper understanding of the unity of mind/body that a remote control.

Week Twelve, Monday, November 7, 2011

Olson's Objections to Immaterialism, Continued

1. **The Duplication Problem:** Zombie worlds just don't sound right.
 - a. **Moreland Replies:** Doesn't sound right to whom? Those who read science fiction seem to have no problem entertaining this possibility.
 - i. **Response to Moreland:** These are pre-scientific intuitions.
 - ii. **Reply by Moreland:** Exactly what scientific discoveries have been made that falsify dualist intuition or dualism itself?
 - b. **Olson's Emergent Dualist Response:** Because mind emerges from matter, zombie worlds would give rise to matter, just like the real world.
 - c. **Olson Replies:** "It is hard to see how the physical activities of a biological organ could bring an immaterial substance into being. That would be creation ex nihilo (the soul wouldn't be forged out of previously existing materials)." (p. 167)

Hylomorphism:

1. Olson understands hylomorphism to be a version of animalism.
 - a. **Moreland Replies:** We want to make a distinction between the thin particular and the thick particular.
 - i. For Hylomorphism the thin particular is the essence that is individuated in matter. That entity is not spatially extended but composed of metaphysical constituents (prime matter, exemplification, and...). The thin particular's having of these properties is a mode of the thin particular. Therefore, **the body on this view is a mode, a modification of, the thin particular;** it is depended for its existence on the thin particular.
 1. Olson doesn't understand that this is the view of most hylomorphic dualists.
 - b. **According to Olson, on this view, the form goes with the brain.**
 - c. **Olson's 1st Objection:**
 - i. **Moreland's Response:** The hylomorphist would not buy Olson's counter example, because Olson seems to be operating on a non-hylomorphic understanding of life. The hylomorphic dualist would say that if the form or the soul goes with the brain you are not going to have a living organism left behind. When the form leaves the body becomes an ordered aggregate.

- d. **Olson's 2nd Objection:** The second animal gets a new brain, and with it, a new organism comes to be. But, how can transferring a brain from one organism to another organism, bring a new organism into being?
 - i. **Moreland Replies:** First, when the brain is in transit it is still an organism. Secondly, Olson seems to deny substantial change (the literal passing away of one thing and the coming to be of something else). Note: substantial change (especially the thin particular) is not empirically verifiable.

Thomistic Dualism (pp. 174-

1. **Olson Objects:** A form has to be the form of something, so it can't exist as a pure form.
 - a. **Moreland Replies:** On one reading of Aquinas, the substantial form is a form, but is a trope. A universal needs something to be instantiated, but tropes do not need anything to be instantiated in, but can exist in its own right.
 - b. **Moreland's 2nd Reply:** On another reading of Aquinas, the soul is prime matter, although not physical. We exist not as a pure form, but an individuated form. Moreland thinks this is probably the correct reading of Aquinas.
2. **Olson's Second Objection:** How can a pure form think? Thoughts don't think, thinkers do.
 - a. **Moreland Replies:** In so far as the pure form is just an individual trope construed as a substance, it just think as an individuated substance. Secondly, ...
3. **Olson's Third Objection:** How could something be a living organism and then be a disembodied immaterial thing?
 - a. **Moreland Replies:** Because, the living organism was immaterial to begin with. Olson seems to fail to understand the more sophisticated hylomorphic views.

Simple Materialism Chisholm & Lowe (pp. 176-

1. For **Chisholm** you are a physical object, so tiny you are simple, with psychological properties.
 - a. **Olson's Objection:** If we grant that we are physical simples with psychological properties, what do we gain if we say we are souls?
 - b. **Moreland Replies:** Is an atomic simple still divisible? It isn't necessary that a divisible thing have different parts. It may be the case that what

Chisholm wanted, a rejection of mereological essentialism with respect to human persons, is not avoided if we are simple physical substances.

- c. **Olson's Second Objection:** Science has discovered that there are no atomic simples.
 - d. **Moreland replies:** This is just patently false.
2. For **Lowe** we are simple material things, or at least simple things with physical parts.
- a. **Lowe is a Personalist:** a person is a metaphysical entity that is neither physical nor immaterial, but has aspects of both. His view would be dualist in the sense that I am not identical to anything physical.
 - b. **Olson's Objection:** Internally heterogeneous objects must have separable parts (p. 178).
 - c. **Moreland Replies:** This is false. Something can be partly red and it doesn't follow that that thing has a red part and a non-red part. It could have no parts, but only a red region and regions that are not red.
 - d. **Moreland Replies:** Olson seems confused about Lowe's view. Lowe doesn't think that all extended things have proper parts as Olson states. Lowe things extension is primitive.

Week Thirteen, November 14, 2011

Olson, Chapter 9

Olson reviews where we have been through the book. Dualism is too mysterious. Moreland thinks this is fair for the naturalist to hold. Olson think the temporal parts view is plausible, but that the constitution view is off the table. He thinks that animalism is the best view and wants to raise a problem that he thinks applies to his animalism.

Animalist and the Thinking Parts Problem

1. The problem is that I think, a part of me doesn't think. However, we may want to say that we think in virtue of having a brain that thinks. The animalist has a problem with that, because if you go that rout it is a short step to saying that it's the brain that thinks. If you mark out the brain that is special you have a hard time not sliding into the brain view, which would make animalism superfluous. But if you deny that the brain is special you can easily end up with the view that several parts of the person think?
2. Olson thinks that the thinking parts problem is not as much a problem for the animalist than the multiple thinkers problem is for the other views. [Dualism, however, escapes this problem].
3. **Olson's Solution:** Add a metaphysical commitment to a sparse ontology (you don't acknowledge the existence of a lot of objects that are difficult for the animalist). The animalist adopts eliminativist views regarding difficult parts.

The Clay Statue Once Again:

1. The animalist wants to say, under certain circumstances, we only have one object here, the statue. They deny that there is the statue and the clay (the animal, and a mass of cells). Constitutionalism is not available to the animalist.
2. **Animalism & The Temporal Parts View:** The problem is that you will probably have to say that the real candidate for you is the temporal part of the animal, which the animalist does not want to hold.
3. **Olson's View:** Become eliminativist about

A Difficulty for Olson

1. To try to find a theory of composition that rules in the right objects, but not the wrong objects.
2. He wants to avoid universalism and the denial of commonsense objects.
3. The goal for Olson is to get rid of brains, top/bottom halves of bodies, nervous systems, or any arbitrary undetached part (some region within a whole that seems arbitrary).
4. **Biological Minimalism (VanInwagen's Solution)**
 - a. Composition doesn't take place except in those places where the parts of a thing come together and constitute a life. Brains don't exist, because brains are not caught up in their own life.
5. **Biological Disjunctivism** (Rosecrans & Hoffman):
 - a. Think VanInwagen rules out too many objects and they don't think there needs to be one single answer to the composition question.
 - b. Composition is satisfied when a collection of parts are *functionally united* or *rigidly bonded with respect to one another*.
6. Olson seems to favor VanInwagen's solution.

The Bottom Line for this Chapter: The animalist, in virtue of these problems, must be supplemented with VanInwagen's views on composition.

Interestingly, what comes to the fore here is the issue of what provides for the unity of a thing. The dualist presses this question well and thinks that you cannot get the right kind of unity by...

Week Fourteen, Monday, November 21

Overview of the Course So Far

1. A look at the biblical text and what Jesus believed. Jesus sides with the Pharisees that the human person exists in a disembodied state after death. This gives us grounds for believing that dualism is true.
2. Late Medieval Neo-Aristotelian views.
3. Survey the options of most thinkers today.
4. A return to the Late Medieval Neo-Aristotelian Views.

Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus

Chapter 1

Common Intuitions Regarding Compound Material Objects

1. **(IMO1)** There are compound material objects (the Existence Assertion).
2. **(IMO2)** There are many different kinds of material objects (Ontological Pluralism).
3. **(IMO3)** Compound material objects endure thru time (No Temporal Parts/4D is false).
4. **(IMO4)** Some material objects can survive part change (Rejection of Mereological Essentialism).
5. **(IMO5)** Two material objects can't exist at the same place at the same time (Rejection of Material Constitution).
6. **(IMO6)** Necessarily, identity is transitive.

The Problem of Material Composition: You cannot logically hold to 1 through 6, at least one of them must be given up.

Apply this to the Ship of Theseus problem:

1, 5, 6 → the reconstructed ship. The original ship is the reconstituted ship.

1, 2, 3, 4 → the continuous ship. The original ship retains its identity through parts replacement.

Note: Moreland rejects the idea that there is a collective group of parts or an aggregate of planks.

1. IMO1 is rejected by the strict eliminativist, for example, Peter Unger who holds there are no concrete physical objects at all.
2. IMO2 is rejected by Peter VanInwagen, along with the claim there is a simple answer to the special constitution problem (the x's compose an object O iff ___).
3. IMO3 is rejected in favor of the temporal parts view. There is no original or new ship of Theseus, the ship is...
4. IMO4 is rejected by those who reject mereological essentialism.
5. IMO5 is rejected by material constitutionalists. They hold that the continuous ship is the correct answer.
6. IMO6 is rejected by those who tend to be relativists regard to identity (Peter Geatch). A relativist regarding: possible worlds, time or sortals (a term that sorts things and expresses a natural kinds that things posses).

Week Fifteen, Monday, November 28, 2011

VanInwagen

The composition question, for him, is what is composition, what does it mean. The special composition question is when composition occurs. For VanInwagen, “being caught up in a life” is the activities of the atomic simples [within the framework of atomism]. VanInwagen adopts a sparse ontology where the only things that exist are those things that are “caught up in a life.”

In application, VanInwagen answers the Ship of Theseus puzzle by holding that artifacts, those things that are not caught up in a life, simply do not exist. Therefore, the ship does not exist. This is to deny the ontological pluralism premise.

Baker

On Baker’s view, the ship of Theseus is composed of the planks and constituted by an object we can call an aggregate of planks. She distinguishes between derived and non-derived properties. Accordingly, she rejects the mereological essentialist premise.

Problem:

Zimmerman

Zimmerman accepts HO, NAHM, and rejects KA. He argues that atomism is false and that sum theory is true. Theseus is a phase in a mass of lumber or there is no ship and just a constituting of masses. He seems to come down on the view that Theseus is a phase in a mass of number.

He distinguishes between masses and phases.

Moreland wants to add the category of ontological goo (a medieval notion).

The Ship of Theseus is composed of a mass of lumber and that ship is...

His primary concern is to work this out in terms of gunky matter

*What is valuable about reading his take is not so much his view, but to work through something very detailed.

Week Fifteen, Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus Ch 3 & 4

Neo-Aristotelians were Motivated by 3 Considerations Regarding Wholes & Parts

1. Commitment to the real existence of substantial change. Integrated wholes pass out of existence and come into existence.
2. Deeply impressed with the fact that living things have a deeper kind of unity than non-living things. They were ontological pluralists.
3. The parts of living things appear to be functional entities. The heart and lungs seem to have their identity by the role they play in the whole. A heart is not a kind of stuff, but a functional entity with respect to its teleology.

Chapter 3: Aquinas' Understanding of Substance

(S4) Substance = def. X is a substance just in case (i) it is a subsistent thing, and (ii) it has to be complete in species.

To be a **subsistent thing** is to not exist in something else as the subject. To be a **complete species** means it doesn't require reference to something extrinsic to it in order to define it. The organs of a living thing are subsistent, but not complete in species.

Essence (i) a set of properties that... (ii) it answers the fundamental questions, "What kind of thing is this?"

Proper Accident = def. A proper accident is a necessary characteristic of a substance that is not part of its essence, but is necessarily brought along with the essence. *Example*: The properties of being mammalian for a dog.

The Intermediary State

According to Aquinas, in the intermediary state, my soul exists, but I do not exist, because I am not identical to my soul.

Aquinas & Parts (think constituent parts)

Metaphysical Part: Constitute the substances existence; it cannot exist without it's metaphysical parts.

Integral Part = def. An integral part is a physically extended quantitative portion of a whole that has a specific function within that whole (think inseparable part). Example: an organ or a hand.

Physical Substance = def. A physical substance is a substance that has 3-dimensional extension.

Two Kinds of Non-living Substances

1. Natural elements: For Aquinas these are air, fire, and water.
2. Natural compounds: an amount of bronze, a puddle of water, a chunk of clay, or a rock.

Four Categories in which two or more things “make up one thing.” Only one of these will be strict composition.

1. **Ordered Aggregates** (heaps, artifacts, collections of things bound together)
2. **Elements:** elements make up a rock by (i) being incorporated into the rock as a substance and (ii) bequeathing some of their powers to the whole
3. **Integral Parts:** They make up a whole by being modes of that whole whose identity is ontologically prior to the part.
4. **Metaphysical Parts:** the substance is made up out of its MP in the sense it is identical to the unity or connection of those parts. Example: form and prime matter.

It is the substantial form that orders the body.

Week Sixteen, Monday, December 5, 2011

Sources on Neo-Aristotelian Views of Chemical Change

1. W. Norris Clark, *The One and the Many* (Notre Dame Press, 2011), pp. 99-102.
2. George Klubertanz, *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 22-29.

Aquinas on Form and Matter

1. **Undesignated matter:** for example, bone and flesh.
2. **Designated matter:** for example, this bone and this flesh; this body.
3. **Form** is a universal until it is united with matter, then it is a particular.
4. *Individuation*
 - a. The thing that individuates humanness is your body (designated matter).

Prime Matter

1. **Aquinas' View:** PM is unextended and it doesn't contain parts. This seems to mean that there is one prime matter and it doesn't get splintered. All forms attach to this single prime matter. On this view PM cannot individuate, because the PM of one thing is identical with the PM of something else.
2. **The Second View:** PM is unextended but it contains parts. It comes splintered and each object has its own prime matter; its own pure individuator.
3. **Extended View 1:** PM always comes attached with extension.
4. **Extended View 2 (Ockham):** PM is a primitive amount of extension.

Principles for Problem of Material Constitution

- (1) **Identity of Substances:** For any material Substance x and y , $x = y$ iff x and y share the same (and only the same?) substantial form.
- (2) **Identity of Aggregates & Artifacts:** For any artifacts x and y , $x = y$ iff (1) share the same matter (2) not have temporal gaps (3) have the same structure.

The Gappy Problem

1. The two principles above imply that when you get your watch cleaned, they take it apart and put it back together, it is not the same watch that you pick it up.

Leclerc, “The Problem of the Physical Existent”

Section 2

3 Kinds of Changes

1. Aggregate Change: A rearrangement of aggregate parts. A house changing the arrangement of its lumber.
2. Two substances give rise to a new substance in which the constituents do not entirely disappear.
3. Two constituents give rise to a new substance and then disappear. They are pure potentialities.

Important Issues: How can these constituents come together to form a substance without forming an aggregate?

Sections 5, 6, and 7: The Problem of Emergent Properties

Three Problems with the Existence of Emergent Properties

1. The parts that rearrange don't appear to have the new property as mere potentialities.
2. If you grant they have the potentiality, it is hard to see how merely rearranging their location relative to one another is going to trigger the change in property.
3. Even if you get an emergent property it seems contingently connect to their bases rather than being necessarily connected. This allows for inverted qualia states and inverted secondary quality states.

Section 9: How to Think of Chemical Change

We have to understand the essence of each reactant. The EER is such that they have the potentiality to combine with another particular reactant and generate a new substantial form.

Nichols, “Aquinas’s Concept of Substantial Form and Modern Science

Three Medieval Views of Substantial Change and Part Incorporation

1. **The Weak Thesis:** Substantial parts ceases to be actual and become potential under the new form.
2. **The Strong Thesis:** The substantial parts remain virtual parts (stronger than potentials) informed by an essence.
3. **The Strongest Thesis:** The substantial part remains a Holon (a part with its own form that functions in light of the new whole).
 - a. Here you seem to have an aggregate. The point is that the parts do not behave the same way within the object as it does outside the object.

Week Sixteen, Wednesday, December 7, 2011